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In 1988, Charles R. Beitz articulated four major areas of ethical concern for international political
theory: the ethics of nuclear deterrence and defence, the propriety of coercive interference in the
internal affairs of sovereign states, the international distributive obligations of the rich countries, and
human rights.1  Some of these issues, such as human rights, retain an ongoing salience in international
political arenas, and have taken on greater significance in the post-Cold War world.  Other issues, such
as the ethics of nuclear deterrence and defence, have faded in significance.  At any rate, it is clear that
the changing international security environment has influenced the kinds of ethical concerns which are
significant for international actors and theorists of international politics.  If “significant developments
in political theory almost always arise from significant developments in political practice,”2 then
changes in the system of international security practices and principles suggest a reexamination of the
links between ethical and security issues.  As the definition of security widens to encompass broader
threats from environmental degradation, mass human migration, cultural colonization and economic
well-being (to name a few), so too do the ethical and normative issues which confront decision makers. 
Some of the emerging areas of concern, as outlined by the Report of the Special Joint Committee of
the Senate and of the House of Commons Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, include: economic
globalization and interdependence, technological change, changing notions of sovereignty, migration,
democratization, cultural change, the global environment, poverty, etc.  What issues or problems are
particularly important given these changes?  What kinds of questions are being posed, or should be
posed by academics, policy makers, and non-governmental groups, in a changing international security
context?
Ethical concerns are inherent in the identification of threats, management of responses, and the
maintenance of national and individual well-being.  Defence, strategic and security policies have
historically been merged in the context of Cold War rivalry and the prominence of traditional threats of
invasion and war.  A twenty-first century security policy addresses a much wider array of threats and
challenges, and thus security policy is confronted with a wider array of ethical and normative
concerns.  A reexamination of precisely how security and ethics are and have been linked in a
changing international context is an important starting point for analysis.  Here it is argued that the
Cold War complex of security practices and principles had particular implications for the kinds of
ethical dilemmas which emerged, and that a decline in this complex leads to a reformulation of these
ethical dilemmas and the emergence of new, more complex ones.
First, the Cold War complex reinforced the role of sovereign states as the agents and objects of
security.  A changing conception of security which focuses on the security of people, independent from
states, suggests new ethical dilemmas for foreign policy.  Second, the Cold War complex of security
practices and principles focussed on military security and defence and strategic policy.  A changing
international security environment includes these concerns, but links these increasingly with economic,
social, human rights, and environmental issues, which also present new ethical dilemmas and
problems.  Third, the Cold War complex of security practices and principles brought some issues to
prominence, such as nuclear deterrence, while it marginalized debate within the international
community on other ethical issues, for example, human rights, development policy, democratization
and social welfare.  Finally, the Cold War complex of security practices and principles defined a
national interest, and through this a national identification, which infused Canada’s globalist foreign
policy with meaning.  The link between a changing international security environment and Canadian
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core values therefore also suggests new sets of ethical dilemmas.  These changes are traced through a
discussion of the four ethical issues introduced by Beitz in 1988, with a view to identifying the outlines
of the new ethical dilemmas, challenges and opportunities presented by a changing international
security environment.
The Ethics of Nuclear Deterrence and Defence
During the Cold War, the system of nuclear deterrence and threat clearly embodied narrow security
practices and principles which circumscribed Canadian foreign and defence policy.  In this context,
Canada’s role as a ‘middle power,’ capable of balancing and moderating Cold War tensions ‘behind
the scenes,’ and intervening as peacekeeper where appropriate and practical, seemed a morally
satisfactory and productive one.  Canada’s commitment to multilateralism was an important part of this
balancing act.  This extensive involvement in multilateral efforts to enhance international peace and
security has historically been two-pronged, involving participation in both NATO collective defence
arrangements and United Nations efforts to enhance collective security.  For many, the end of the Cold
War suggested a reinvigoration of the latter, whose principles were more universal in scope, were non-
directional rather than specific to a predesignated target, and were not confined by the restrictive
prerogatives of nuclear deterrence.3  Furthermore, an enhanced system of collective security offered
the promise of an expanded role for smaller powers such as Canada to contribute to a ‘new
internationalism’ based on multilateralism and the international rule of law.4  Ethically, support of
collective security, multilateralism and a revised system of peacekeeping seemed very much in line
with established Canadian traditions of mediation, moral leadership, and humanitarianism.
Collective security as a normative system, however, has its ethical pitfalls and dilemmas.  The
ethical issues posed by a system of collective security are complex, but here I will focus on two which
are of particular concern to Canadians.  The first is the tendency for collective security to reinforce
state-based patterns and practices of security.  The unequivocal identification of state and society
interests is integral to collective security.  In a sense, the debate about nuclear ethics, which began to
gain steam in the late-1980s, paved the way for a desegregation of state and society interests because it
raised the question of whether it was in fact moral to threaten the innocent citizens of a state with
nuclear annihilation in order to preserve national security.  A straightforward identification of state and
society interests was therefore undermined, opening up to question international security practices of
states more widely.  Furthermore, conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the breakup of the Soviet Union,
and the persistence of civil strife in the developing world reinforced the paralysis of a system of
collective security.  Based on a strict adherence to the principles of national sovereignty and non-
intervention, collective security did not address these ‘new’ security threats.
The outlines of the moral dilemma, however, became particularly acute during the Gulf War,
which was touted as the quintessential test of collective security mechanisms and principles in the
‘New World Order.’ Ambassador Philippe Kirsch described this action as “a military offensive
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launched by the collective will of the international community against a country which had
systematically and viciously violated all the accepted norms of international conduct.”5  However, the
ethical condemnation of Saddam Hussein was not confined to Iraq’s aggression against the sovereign
nation of Kuwait, but also to his abuse of minority groups in Iraq, and the generally distasteful
domestic structure of the Iraqi regime.  Resolution 688 demanded an end to oppression of the Kurdish
population of Iraq by the Iraqi government — a move some have interpreted as extending the legal
basis of humanitarian intervention.6  The limited conduct of the war, and the resulting peril of the
Kurds and other suppressed minorities within Iraq thus revealed the moral limitations of collective
security — its inability to address the security needs of people rather than states.
The second ethical dilemma of collective security is the problem of enforcement.  Subjective
agreement that collective security is threatened, is required between the members of the international
community in order to undertake enforcement.  This presents an ethical dilemma because the
identification, analysis and management of a threat is not an automatic mechanism, but  is selective.7 
Therefore, collective security’s pretense to uphold higher goals and norms of international peace and
security is continually undermined by the internal contradiction of double standards in application. 
Again, the Gulf War seemed to present an ideal instance in which agreement could be found on
universal norms on which to rest collective security.  However, despite the seeming uniqueness in the
actions of Iraq in invading its sovereign neighbour and its ‘fit’ with the scenarios of collective security,
other instances of failed intervention appeared which seemed equally morally and legally suited to
collective enforcement measures.  The breakdown of the former Yugoslavia was legally messy, with
many clear violations of norms of international law and conduct, yet enforcement measures on the
scale of the response to Iraq were not forthcoming.  The annexations of Tibet and East Timor, and the
invasion of Iran by Iraq, seemed to be other clear examples.8  While early developments in the 1990s
suggested that the conclusion of the Cold War had reduced the global degree of normative and
ideological diversity,9 and thus made cooperation more likely, subsequent events have undermined this
thesis and suggested that normative agreement among supporters of collective security may not be as
promising as once thought.
Canada’s experience in the Gulf War had morally contradictory lessons.  On the one hand, the
importance of upholding the principles of collective security suggested active support and enforcement
of Security Council Resolution 687.  On the other hand, many Canadians feared that the Security
Council itself was working to serve the interests not of international peace and security, but of one
Great Power — the United States.  These reservations were compounded by a sense that a mixed
strategy of compellance and reassurance, with a greater role for constructive diplomacy, had been
10Von Riekhoff, Op. Cit., 245.
overrun by a ‘growing military momentum.’10  Thus, for many Canadians, the Gulf War illustrated the
limitations of the system of collective security for preserving international peace and security.  The
Gulf experience also illustrated the ethical dilemmas for Canada in active engagement with a more
aggressive system of collective security.  Peace enforcement was somewhat at odds with
peacekeeping.  Canadian experience with collective security enforcement led, for many, to a search for
alternative conceptions of security which more closely reflect Canadian norms, identity and values.
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Interference in the Internal Affairs of Sovereign States
The second major issue in international ethics identified by Beitz was the propriety of coercive
interference in the internal affairs of other states.  The practice of intervention, as pursued by the
superpowers during the Cold War, was inextricably linked with the larger security practices which
constituted global security strategy.  Whether it was coercive intervention policy in the Third World
such as the Vietnam War, the attempt to destabilize Nicaragua in the 1980s; or ‘benign’ intervention
such as the Carter administrations’ human rights policy, the normative foundation for discussions
about intervention was the overarching framework of Cold War threats, whether military or
ideological.  Denis Stairs point out: “During the cold war, most military conflicts around the globe
were understood (rightly or wrongly) as different scenes in the same play — written, that is, in
reference to the same theme and performed by the same rules.”11  For Canada, the security practices
and principles which guided ‘interventionist’ policies were those of peacekeeping.  Peacekeeping as a
complex of security practices and principles was circumscribed by wider global security practices and
principles.  Peacekeeping offered an alternative ‘ethical’ model of intervention, and the success or
failure of these operations also helped to define the boundaries of legitimate international security
practices.  As classical peacekeeping has been abandoned in favour of new forms of intervention, the
relationship between ethics and security takes on new configurations.
William Epstein provides the following definition of peacekeeping: “a specific type of
operation or action where military personnel (unarmed as military observers and only lightly armed as
peacekeeping forces) are sent to one area of armed conflict, with the consent of the contending parties,
to supervise and maintain a cease-fire previously agreed to by the parties [emphasis in the original].”12 
These actions, as is well known, have no specific sanction in the UN Charter and, as such, the
normative basis of peacekeeping has emerged almost exclusively from specific peacekeeping
operations.  The link between norms and security in the case of peacekeeping is complex, but two
dimensions will be emphasized here: peacekeeping as a security practice is undergirded by the
principle of neutral intervention, and secondly, by the interest of the international community in
controlling conflicts which threaten the wider peace and security.  Both of these normative pillars have
been undermined in the post-Cold War era, as the principle of neutral intervention has been eroded by
experiences on the ground, and the interests of the international community in confining conflicts has
become less clear.
These developments suggest three ethical dilemmas of peacekeeping as a normative system.  If
neutrality and impartiality can no longer claim to be part of peacekeeping, then how can peacekeeping
be morally distinguished from other, more reprehensible forms of interventionism?  Under the security
complex of the Cold War, this was less of a dilemma, because of peacekeeping’s proscribed nature. 
During the Cold War, peacekeeping activities were governed by the principle of consent: the
agreement of the parties to a dispute was required before peacekeepers could be dispatched,13 boosting
14Alan James, Peacekeeping in International Politics (New York: MacMillan, 1990), 3.  James also makes
explicit the link between the principle of consent and the norm of impartiality.  When consent of one of the parties is lost,
then so too is the veneer of impartiality and the legitimacy of the action is undermined.  Ibid., 7.
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16This argument takes no issue with the idea that the Cold War security consensus also placed these values
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the legitimacy of peacekeeping forces.  Alan James suggests that: “If a force or an observer group fails
to observe this value [impartiality] it will become little less than an accessory to one side, and a fairly
ineffectual one at that . . . it will have lost its claim to be a peacekeeping body.”14  However, as Alex
Morrison points out, “Peacekeepers are not neutral.  They do not stand aside, they are not indifferent.
They deal with the here and the now, with that which is real.  They are required to assess and act.”15 
This requires making moral judgements on otherwise internal matters.  While peacekeeping could
construct a moral high ground of impartiality built on the foundations of a normative and practical
adherence to minimal intervention and at least implied respect for national sovereignty, the claims of
‘peacemaking’ and ‘peacebuilding’ have no such limitations.  Preventive peacekeeping, peacemaking
and peace enforcement all try to redefine and reconstruct the normative conditions for intervention in a
number of ways: by taking account of ‘new’ or ‘emerging’ threats to international security, by
reformulating peacekeeping in terms of humanitarian intervention, and/or by reformulating the basis
on which peacekeeping forces are assembled.
A second ethical dilemma arises again from peacekeeping’s Cold War heritage.  If
peacekeeping could in the past be justified on the basis of controlling violent conflict in the context of
Cold War nuclear tensions (sort of the lesser of two evils argument), then logically, intervention in the
absence of the threat of escalation of nuclear war is less justified, not more.  A search for humanitarian
justifications is undertaken which can qualify new forms of intervention.  To this approach the above
question about the moral distinctiveness of peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peacemaking still
applies, however a further concern is raised: what is the nature of the connection between security
(however broadly construed) and ethical humanitarian intervention, if any?  While a clear
identification of interests and ethics could be found in the conditions of peacekeeping’s birth, no such
clear identification can be made in the 1990s.
The third ethical dilemma is the question of core values and Canadian identity.  Instinctively,
peacekeeping seems to offer a mode of international intervention which responds to Canadians’
general demand for fairness, decency, and justice.  However, changes to the principles and practices of
peacekeeping tend to undermine this correspondence, and there seems little to replace these as a
system of reference for Canadian identity.  On what normative basis should choices be made about
where and when intervention is necessary?  How do we understand our security interests in relation to
others?  What kinds of ‘core values’ are we protecting?
The Cold War, while seemingly presenting very narrow circumscribed options for security, in
fact defined these core values rather widely,16 as everything from the preservation and promotion of
democracy worldwide to the prevention of nuclear war and weapons proliferation.  In other words, a
geo-strategic conceptualization of national security includes a complex of security goals and values,
which are validated and reinforced through particular security practices such as the provision of
17Kim Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1997), 58.
18Jackson, “Armed Humanitarianism,” 596.
alliances, support of international law, and peacekeeping contributions.  Such a complex has yet to be
determined to define the post-Cold War security order, and more specifically, Canada’s role within it.
Canada’s extensive experience in peacekeeping has historically raised many ethical questions. 
However, these have become more pointed as the opportunities for such missions have expanded and
the Cold War circumstances which defined peacekeeping have faded.  A comparison of the Suez Crisis
and the Somalia case illustrates the changing nature of the relationship between security and ethics in
peacekeeping practices and principles.  In the case of the Suez Crisis of 1956, Pearson’s proposal to
send an international force to the Suez area, position itself between the warring parties and bring an
end to the military hostilities, was the defining peacekeeping operation.  UNEF I provided a
circumstance for which the interests of international security and ethical considerations happily
coincided.  The strict adherence to the non-use of force, the use of non-threatening and lightly-armed
forces, and the participation of small or middle powers rather than the superpowers established the
normative basis of peacekeeping on impartiality, self-defence, and peace maintenance as ‘goods’ for
which Canada and other countries could stand up.  This operation was widely viewed as a success
within its own terms.  As a symbol of the type of action which Canada could reasonably engage in as a
middle power, it fitted very well with the emerging Canadian self-image as a neutral power in the Cold
War world and a mediator and regulator of ‘brush fire wars’ which could threaten global peace and
security.17  Peacekeeping was morally distinguished in this action from other interventions by an
appeal to strict neutrality and the principle of consent.
The case of Somalia illustrates the ethical dilemmas of shifting the normative complex of
peacekeeping practices and principles from consent to the looser ground of humanitarianism. 
Canada’s experience in Somalia, like the Gulf War, was ethically ambivalent.  First, the United
Nations intervention in Somalia was justified by Secretary General Boutros Ghali with an appeal to
traditional concerns of international peace and security and the threat of wider regional conflict,
arguments which Canada and most other countries were familiar with from Cold War peacekeeping
practices.  Armed intervention thus became closely linked in political discourse to security issues, in
opposition to strictly moral ones.  As in the case of the establishment of ‘safe havens’ for the Kurds in
the Gulf War, the United Nations’ case for intervention was made on security grounds: a breakdown in
civil order in Somalia would threaten regional and international peace and security.  However, as
Jackson suggests, the case for a strictly security-based intervention was a hollow one in the absence of
wider implications for what was still essentially an internal conflict.  “There were no obvious peace
and security reasons for intervening in Somalia — certainly not any that were even remotely
comparable to those in the Iraq-Kuwait case.”18  Thus, the justification was looked upon with suspicion
by weaker countries who feared a return to the UN protectorate system.  The Somalian case did not
correspond neatly to one important dimension of the peacekeeping security complex: a violation of the
basic norm of non-intervention seemed less justified in the absence of wider security threats, not more.
Secondly, the normative basis of intervention in Somalia was not consent of the parties, as had
been the case in Egypt, but rather humanitarianism.  The legitimacy provided by consent, the
traditional normative basis for peacekeeping, was absent, as there was no solicitation of intervention
by the Somali state.  The debates about humanitarian intervention versus state sovereignty are familiar
to most in the foreign policy community by now, and I will not belabour these again here.  There is
little doubt that extending ethical justifications for intervention to humanitarian ones is closely linked
19Tom Keating and Nicholas Gammer, “The ‘new look’ in Canada’s Foreign Policy,” International Journal,
vol. XLVII, no. 4 (Autumn 1993), 740.
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with an expansion of the security agenda to include areas traditionally defined within national
jurisdiction, including, among others, democratization, economic development, respect for human
rights and ‘good governance.’  It is also closely linked with the imperative, in the post-Cold War era,
to focus ethical standing on individuals and communities (civil societies) as well as states.  The
dilemmas here, from an ethical perspective, are again complex: the norm of humanitarian justification
for intervention is undeveloped in international law, which continues to place the primary
responsibility for security of individuals on their respective states.  Humanitarian standards are thus
double-edged.  “Without some specific agreed criteria, it will be difficult for Canada or any other state
to be consistent in its decisions.”19  This opens the door to charges of ‘double standards.’
While the older principle and practice of consent established the legitimacy of peacekeeping
operations a priori by reinforcing the pre-existing rights of sovereigns to veto interventions, the
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention is more reliant on ex-post-facto justifications.20  One possible
effect of this is to make the ethical case for intervention much more dependent on the perception of
success or failure rather than an appeal to universal principles of justice or international law. 
Perception is notoriously unreliable and as communication links between societies continue to
multiply, increasingly impressionistic.  Denis Stairs and others have referred to the ‘CNN
phenomenon’ which leads citizens to insist on direct action. However, this is not only a mass
phenomenon.  Brian Mulroney noted, that we should “dispense with debating the niceties of this
‘principle’ or that ‘concept’ and get . . . on with the job of building peace and prosperity.”21  Both
involve complex normative choices, but they are at odds.  If one is pursued, it compromises the other.
All of this is not to suggest that humanitarianism is a less appropriate moral basis for
intervention, quite the opposite, a humanitarian element is, I think, historically integral to classical
peacekeeping and arguably an essential justification for Canadian foreign policy.  The point here is
that a post-sovereign security environment suggests a widening array of ethical dilemmas for all states,
not just Canada.  As the primary locus of moral agency, states continue to be the legitimate source of
ethical standards, yet a new moral imperative demands that societies and individuals be given higher
moral standing as subjects of the international community.
For some governments, this may be exactly the point: advances in international law are
established by practice, not ritual agreement on ethical principles.  For some, this represents an
opportunity for Canada to play a role in legitimizing the principle of humanitarian intervention, while
simultaneously reclaiming ‘actor legitimacy’ by distinguishing Canada from other countries.  For some
governments then, this is seen as an opportunity to reconstruct the happy coincidence of national
interest and ethical practice characteristic of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era.  Where Canada’s
unique position as a ‘middle power’ in terms of capability, geography and foreign policy was the basis
for the practices and principles of peacekeeping in the Cold War era, so a new identity of ‘humane
internationalist’ based on a long tradition of multilateralism could be constructed in conjunction with
22MacDougall, quoted in Keating and Gammer, “The ‘new look’ in Canada’s Foreign Policy,” 734.
humanitarian intervention.   This new identification is based on action as opposed to deliberation. 
Thus, an identity which corresponds to long-standing Canadian core values of respect for human
rights, democracy, and aid is found in the package of a ‘new look.’
However, recent Canadian experiences have proven that such a reconstructing of Canadian
identity faces new ethical dilemmas, and thus there is a certain ambivalence inherent in the project. 
The Somalia affair raised questions about the kinds of core values Canadians represented abroad and at
home.  The murder of a Somali teenager at the hands of Canadian peacekeepers and the resulting
inquiry into abuses by Canadian soldiers abroad raises questions about the consistency of an approach
which proclaimed humanitarian ideals yet failed to achieve those same standards in practice.  The
Somalia mission was explicitly characterised differently from the classical model of UNEF and other
operations, as “an enforcement mission which means it is essentially peacemaking as opposed to
peacekeeping.”22  On the one hand, the breakdown of civil order within the country, the threat of
widespread famine and starvation, and the widespread abuse of human rights appeared ample moral
justification for intervention.  On the other hand, the focus on intervention opened the door to an
expansive mandate which ultimately led to a ‘humanitarian war’ with little to distinguish it morally
from other less noble interventions.  A clear identification of Canadian core values and identity with
new international security practices and principles of humanitarian intervention is thus elusive for two
reasons: the focus on action at the expense of deliberation places an emphasis on immediate successes
in terms of positive outcomes (an end to famine, civil war, etc.), and related to this, the outcome of
intervention is the defining yardstick for establishing the grounds for revolutionary changes in
international security principles and practices.  Where peacekeeping could establish the grounds for
these changes in  correspondence with the wider norms of international security in the Cold War era,
the correspondence between ethics and security is less clear in the case of humanitarian intervention.
23Kathleen E. Mahoney, “Human Rights and Canada’s Foreign Policy,” International Journal, vol. XLVII, no.
3 (Summer 1992), 556.
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25Canada’s International Relations. Response of the Government of Canada to the Report of the Special Joint
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Human Rights
The third ethical issue raised by Beitz is the question of human rights.  “Where human rights were
once considered matters of purely domestic concern narrowly construed, global forces now mandate
that they take on broader international dimensions, transcend borders, and command ever widening
participation in their definition and implementation.”23  This new internationalization of rights contains
both opportunities and challenges for Canadian international security policy.  The opportunities
emerge from a broadening security agenda which no longer relegates human rights to a subordinate
‘domestic’ issue, and thus legitimizes international action.  Since the Second World War, Canada has
played an important and assertive role in supporting global respect for human rights, in the
development of international human rights law, and in the active condemnation of human rights
violators in multilateral forums.  A Canadian, John Humphrey, helped draft the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and was the first director of the United Nations’ Division of Human Rights.24  These
initiatives have been based on the principle that it is “logical and proper that the standards we promote
within Canada should find full expression in Canadian foreign policy.”25  This assertive approach to
human rights promotion is in close correspondence as well with the Canadian commitment to the
principle of equal individual moral worth and human dignity, even in the context of a multicultural,
unequal, and legally divided system of global sovereignties.  In this context, the democratization of
Eastern European countries and the spread of national liberation movements of the late-1980s
suggested new possibilities for a revival of human rights initiatives in the post-Cold War era.
The challenges emerge from a more complex relationship between ethics and security, and
between the state and the international community, which de-links global human rights provisions
from global obligations.  One of the most widely-recognized definitions of a right is something that
automatically produces or creates a duty elsewhere in the political system, for example, a right to free
speech creates a duty to respect that right, not to silence dissent.  In the case of economic, social and
cultural rights, these duties are more pro-active, requiring resources to be fulfilled.  In international
politics, although rights are spoken about all the time there is a reluctance to recognize that we have
any fundamental duties to people in other parts of the world. As discussed above in the case of
humanitarian intervention, while states continue to be the legitimate source of ethical standards, a new
moral imperative demands that societies and individuals be given higher moral standing as holders of
rights in the international community.  While the Cold War complex of security principles and
practices reinforced the moral standing of the state and its rights and obligations, the post-Cold War
era provides a more internationalized approach to human rights.  This internationalization focuses
attention particularly upon the question of the relationships of rights and obligations globally.
The classical opposition of states’ versus individual rights, a major theme in international law,
continues to pose a fundamental ethical dilemma for decision makers, as it did in 1988.  In 1997,
however, these have become more complex due to a number of factors: the composition of ‘domestic’
26This is true even of ‘negative rights’ such as civil and political rights, which although ethically derived from
universal principles of natural law, required state defence in the face of challenges from abroad, and thus an active
commitment on the part of the state.
27Cyrus R. Vance, “The Human Rights Imperative,” Foreign Policy (Summer 1986) reprinted in Taking Sides:
Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in World Politics, 3rd edition (Guildford, Conn: Dushkin, 1991) 257.
28Mahoney, “Human Rights and Canada’s Foreign Policy,” 562.
societies has become increasingly ‘globalized’ by an increase in human migration, there is a renewed
focus on North-South issues, and powerful forces of economic and cultural globalization have changed
territorial conceptions of sovereignty and facilitated an international exchange of values.  So, while
human rights and ethical questions are increasingly raised in the context of foreign aid, trade,
investment, development, and security policies, there is as yet no clear articulation of states’ changing
rights and responsibilities vis-a-vis their citizens, and vis-a-vis the international community.
The Cold War complex of security practices and principles reinforced the idea that the state
was the primary locus of security.  Human rights doctrines were subsumed into a discourse of national
security: rights were features of the relationship between individuals and their state and as such, were
ultimately derivative of the security provided by the state, at least in so far as foreign policy was
concerned.26  Both the United States and the Soviet Union disdained international comment or
influence on their human rights records and both chose to overlook human rights violations within
their own spheres of influence or among their allies.  In the United States, Jeane Kirkpatrick’s
November 1979 Commentary article made this clear by affirming the policy of the United States to
support ‘authoritarian’ countries friendly to the US.27  The ethical dilemmas of human rights, then, just
as in the case of peacekeeping and collective security, were structured by the normative system of
practices and principles which defined the Cold War security complex.  Normative discussion was
channelled into the modest project of  elaborating and codifying common international standards in the
face of ideological split over the meaning of human rights policy.  Although human rights and their
defence helped to constitute the ethical justification of security practices and principles, their force and
power were confined by prerogatives of state security which overall confined human rights questions
to the ‘low politics’ of economic, social and cultural (domestic) issues.  “The international security
strategy that gave a veto power to both the United States and the Soviet Union ensured that
international attempts to put human rights ahead of domestic processes would be ineffective.”28 
Furthermore, human rights questions posed uncomfortable challenges to both liberal and communist
ideological doctrine, as well as to the whole system of nuclear deterrence, which was so carefully
managed by the two superpowers.  These differences were underscored by a split between
individualized civil and political rights, emphasized by the West, and collective economic, social and
cultural rights, emphasized by the East.  Discourse thus tended to focus in multilateral institutions on
the more abstract legal questions of the nature and concepts of human rights, and whether rights could
be codified on a common moral foundational basis.
The split within human rights discussions over rights priorities continues, but the divisions of
individual versus collective rights and civil versus economic rights have been lessened as both East
and West conceded some role for the others’ concerns.  For this reason, efforts have recently shifted
away from the abstract questions of codification toward the more substantive questions of application. 
As the East-West divide is replaced by that between North and South, the question of rights priorities
clearly reflects the shift in security practices and principles from national security to wider conceptions
29Ibid., 565.
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of security.  This is not simply a transferral of the same issues from East-West to North-South, but a
new framing of the issues overshadowed by two new concerns: the question of development rights and
democratization.
In 1986 Canada supported the UN General Assembly’s recognition of the right to development
as an inalienable human right.29  In this initiative, collective and individual rights, which are deemed
indivisible, become part of a whole complex of rights concerns which encompass social, economic and
political dimensions of individual and collective life.  Rather than subsuming human rights questions
into the domestic sphere, this new formulation emphasizes that “the state derives legitimacy and ‘state
rights’ from its individual human components.”30  Less developed countries (LDCs) argue that the
interdependent structure of the global economy makes development rights an increasingly important
dimension of international political life, and that this right imposes new obligations on the developed
world to respond to the crisis of underdevelopment and inequality globally.  Developed countries
argue that a global vision of security demands a democratic framework within states for development
to proceed.  Where the North tends to see state structures as assuming new obligations, deriving from
individual rights, the South tends to place the locus of obligations onto the international community.
How do these relate to security issues?  These new lines of conflict between North and South
are emerging in the context of changing security principles and practices which reinforce the
legitimacy of certain forms of pro-active intervention to protect human rights in situations of crisis. 
This more aggressive interventionist approach is at least partially based on the interpretation of
persistent poverty, natural or human disaster, and mass migration as a global security threat, rather
than a problem of development.  This new relationship between security concerns and human rights
concerns suggests two ethical dilemmas.  The first dilemma, arising from the debate over development
rights, addresses the practical issue of the links between resources and rights: given the indivisibility of
individual and collective rights to development, what is the ethical link between human rights
provision in LDCs and the resource obligations of the developed countries?  The second has to do with
the introduction of a new human rights agenda with a new prioritization of democratic and
development rights: how can one reconcile the tensions between a new interventionist global security
order and domestic democratization efforts?
While the international community has emphasized the need for LDC governments to assume
greater responsibilities for human rights protection, developed countries have reduced their aid
commitments or made these more stringently conditioned on a good human rights record.  So, as the
international community persists in establishing a right to intervene militarily in defence of global
security and human rights provision, it is reluctant to take on the real burdens and obligations which
make human rights realizable, preferring instead to off-load these obligations onto developing
countries or the private sector.  Changing security practices and principles legitimize pro-active
interventionist policies when violations reach offensive levels, but these only weakly link resource
obligations and development rights to security policy.  The obligations to support welfare remain
primarily with LDC states.  The Special Joint Committee’s Report in 1994 suggests that “the
international development agenda used to be about what developed countries could do for developing
countries.  This now is becoming the global sustainable development agenda — what we must all do to
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enhance our common security.”31  In fact, therefore, for developing countries these actually become a
new security obligation.
In an increasingly competitive environment, the LDC states must appeal not to the democratic
publics of developed countries for development resources, but rather to self-interested private investors
with little concern for human rights protection (individual or collective), or alternatively, to private aid
agencies reliant on humanitarian sensibilities in the rich countries.  This problem becomes an ethical
dilemma because a scarcity of resources forces choices between human rights values when these
conflict, undermining efforts to assert ‘the indivisibility’ of economic, social and cultural rights from
civil and political rights, and to realize a right to development.  In sum, an internationalized system of
human rights action is poorly linked with new ethical obligations on the part of the international
community to make domestic guarantees of human rights and security realizable.
The problem of democratization and security is closely linked with the dilemma discussed
above.  The ‘democratic framework’ for aid targets specific goals of democratization, education and
institutional development and strengthening.32  In the context of a more assertive international
community, intrusions on sovereignty are justified by the argument that “if a government lacks internal
legitimacy, it should lack external legitimacy.”33  However, attempts to re-legitimize domestic political
processes by democratization are compromised when security is imposed from the outside, and when,
as discussed above, development rights are not integrated into security considerations.  The goals of
democratization and security (now both globally construed) are placed at odds.
Thus, we see two contradictory human rights strategies being pursued by the international
community in pursuit of the goals of development and democratization, both in congruence with a
more globalized concept of human security.  One approach is ‘action-oriented’ and involves armed
intervention or sanctions to protect people from human rights abuses.  A justification for a harder-line
approach is that “human rights abuses can no longer be justified because of economic difficulties.”34 
The other approach, more low-key and evolution-oriented, suggests ‘constructive engagement’ of
countries through stronger economic, cultural and social ties which will contribute to greater human
rights sensibility indirectly through the development of civil society.  Both of these approaches appear
to be in favour in Canada and in tune with a changed international security environment.  However, the
ethical criteria for choosing between these strategies are not clearly defined.  It is too soon to tell
whether the ‘stick’ or the ‘carrot’ will be most effective in terms of human rights promotion. 
Nevertheless, the ethical tension inherent in policies which utilize both alternatives remains.
The choice to utilize one strategy over the other involves choices between social values, a
ranking of norms internationally which affects Canada’s (or other countries) ability to formulate future
choices.  The choice to intervene assertively to defend human rights by restricting official aid or
supporting armed intervention may further de-legitimize state structures, compromising opportunities
to democratize.  The choice to support private investment, commercial and financial ties exclusive of
human rights policies compromises opportunities to condemn abusers in the future, and critics will
point to the self-interested justification for these.  “Canada, like most other human rights supporting
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nations, seems often to be in the position of piously condemning human rights abuses ‘on sundays’ and
then carrying on business as usual — including mutually lucrative business — with human rights
abusing countries, during the rest of the week.”35  The tendency to pursue both strategies, and to apply
these inconsistently, compromises the ability to formulate a clear normative framework for human
rights provision, either domestically or internationally, in the context of a changing security
environment.
In sum, a global security policy presents new ethical dilemmas of human rights provision, as
questions focus less on rights priorities and more on strategies.  The new North-South context imposes
different ethical considerations than does the Cold War because security issues do not fully incorporate
the particular challenges of underdevelopment.  Some new conceptions of security, such as the concept
of global human security — defined in the Special Joint Committee’s Report in 1994 as “human rights,
economic prosperity, and environmentally sustainable development”36 — do attempt to incorporate
development problems and human rights as security issues.  The problem here is that a globally-
construed conception of security can be double-edged with respect to human rights promotion.  Many
may applaud the new focus and emphasis on human rights internationally and the effort to integrate
rights conceptions into security, as well as the departure from the constricting practices and principles
of a national security complex which does not prioritize rights as international issues.  On the other
hand, recognizing that development, human rights and security are linked can legitimize very different,
even conflicting policy options.  Even a partial recognition of the role of human rights in security
policy says little about the nature of the ethical obligations which the right to development imposes
between North and South.  Finally, the new questions of development and democracy which structure
human rights debates and North-South relations contain particular ethical dilemmas emerging from the
changing role of the state, as new security rights are enforced by the international community and not
accompanied by a recognition of corresponding international obligations.
International Distributive Obligations of the Rich Countries
The final set of ethical issues discussed by Beitz are those of distributive justice between rich and poor. 
International security practices and principles in the 1980s affected the kinds of ethical issues and
questions which confronted the international community.  A changing economic context, including an
interdependent yet competitive relationship between North and South, has provoked a new concern in
the 1990s with regard to economic aspects of security.  Distributive ethics, although no less urgent in
the post-Cold War era, have to some extent been overshadowed by debates about economic security
and competitiveness.  Calls for global redistributive justice in the 1970s were spurred by the impetus
of movement for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), deliberations over the Law of the Sea,
the energy crisis, and the crisis of poverty of the 1970s and 1980s.
In line with both domestic and international developments, the creation of the Canadian
International Development Agency (CIDA) in 1972 gave aid a distinctive place in Canada’s foreign
policy.  Aid policies began with the observation that “the primary purpose of Canadian development
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assistance is to help the poorest countries and people of the world.”37  This goal corresponds well with
Canadian values of collective social responsibility for basic needs, humanitarianism and international
justice.  As well, Canadian support of the economic reforms of UNCTAD and commitments to “the
promotion of economic development through financial and technical assistance; the removal of
restrictions on imports from developing countries, and similar programmes”38 also suggested some
Canadian support for the goal of mitigating global structural inequities.  Canada also underscored its
commitment to an open liberal economic order through its support of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), World Bank, and GATT, and the development of export assistance programmes and export
financing.  Official development assistance, often linked with trade development, human rights and
‘efficient delivery,’ has historically reflected a liberal development model of private sector support,
export-led growth, domestic structural adjustment to changing global economic conditions,
development of comparative advantage and the extension of credit.  In 1987, this focus was even more
pronounced by a new framework of official development assistance, which offered “new initiatives for
the private sector.”39
Canadian support for a liberal model of development, while infusing a humanitarian impulse
into an otherwise intransigent ideological battle between East and West, nevertheless stopped short of
confronting the question of ethical obligations and responsibilities for global poverty.  The liberal
development model suggested that poverty would ultimately be addressed by an “open and dynamic
system . . . [which would] provide . . . the most promising environment for economic growth and social
progress.”40  The 1994 Foreign Policy Review reiterated the importance of humanitarian values to
Canadians, while making more explicit the links with security issues, by stating that “together with
peacekeeping, development assistance reflects the elementary and intertwined human concerns for
global justice and peace.”41
While distributive justice issues were marginalized by the Cold War complex of security
practices and principles, those discussions concerning NIEO were also structured by these in important
ways.  The politicization and internationalization of inequality issues occurred in the context of an
ideological deadlock over appropriate global models of development.  Here the Cold War complex of
security practices and principles helped to provide the framework justification for the promotion of
comprehensive and competing models of economic and political development, each of which would
(theoretically) address issues of poverty, technological backwardness, overpopulation and industrial
development in the Third World.  Both the United States and the Soviet Union wooed Third World
countries with aid, trade, and technological assistance, internationalizing domestic and local economies
for the purpose of advancing their ideological development models.  Official development assistance
was often state-to-state, focussed on elites rather than the needs of the poorest, and designed to provide
the maximum demonstration of technological advancement.  This led to contradictions between state-
based strategies of social welfare provision and global strategies of economic development.
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The ethical dilemmas of the post-Cold War era, although distinct, are emerging from the
changes in international security practices and principles from an East-West to a North-South nexus. 
Two of these dilemmas are: how can the tension between concerns with Northern economic security be
reconciled with the question of the global ethical obligations of the rich to the poor?  Second, a
growing managerial and instrumental approach to distributive questions suggests other ethical
dilemmas:  how can a managerial approach also be democratically accountable?  How can a renewal of
an instrumental approach to aid be reconciled with growing global interdependence?
The politicization and internationalization of Third World claims to distributive justice were
partially an attempt to address these tensions within global development models between domestic
social welfare and internationalized economies.  The efforts by liberal states to grow by engaging with
international markets also compromised social welfare provisions.  The efforts by socialist states to
preserve domestic social welfare were continually challenged by a growing system of interdependent
economic relations and an overemphasis on large infrastructure and industrial developments at the
expense of local communities.  The call for NIEO attempted to address the contradictions between
domestic welfare strategies and global economic strategies by infusing  global economic relations with
a new distributive ethic.  Thus, it was argued, growing global interdependence imposed ethical
obligations internationally as well as domestically between rich and poor.  The principle of equal
respect between North and South for basic human needs of food, clothing and shelter placed a moral
obligation on Northern countries to meet these development needs.
Although fuelled as well by environmental and resource issues, the transfer of distributive
justice questions from domestic to international arenas ultimately failed.  The models of development,
and in particular the foreign aid channels which worked to open local economies to global influence,
had not encompassed distributive ethics as constitutive of global economic relations between North
and South.  The Cold War goals of the superpowers to globalize local economies were not focussed on
resource distribution, but rather were structured by the ideological necessity to establish and secure
regimes which reflected their respective development models.  In this context, then,
internationalization of Third World economies led LDC governments to act as agents of international
economic interests, rather than to address local development and welfare.  While some governments, in
particular oil-producing states, were able to assert their demands more effectively in the international
marketplace, the effort to place distributive questions on the agenda was undermined by a continuing
commitment to individual national interest.  In other words, in the context of the Cold War complex of
security practice and principles, global economic relations were derivative of security relations.
These security relations, East-West oriented as they were, were not served by the
internationalization of distributive ethics, which were subordinated, in the same way as human rights
questions, to national security and ‘high politics’ issues.  Although these issues became more
prominent in the 1970s and 1980s as international issues, distributive ethics were not generally
accepted as problems for the international system since “the conventional wisdom, which was accepted
almost without question, was the principle of distributive justice applied exclusively within the state
[emphasis in original].”42  For liberals, the question of distributive ethics (whether domestic or
international) was uncomfortable, since it challenged ideological assumptions about the universal
benefits of market-driven economies.  For socialists, it is not as straightforward.  While distributive
ethics were integral to socialist values of mitigation of inequality and provision of social welfare,
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security priorities tended to focus on the consolidation of socialist regimes in the Third World, and
secondarily on the global inequalities between North and South.43
Nevertheless, the fading of the Cold War security complex, and with it the pressures to prevent
issues of distributive justice from being internationalized, may provide many opportunities and
challenges.  The opportunities lie in the beginning of a new dialogue on a right to development which
once again asserts that distributive ethics are a legitimate and integral part of global economic and
security relationships.  A changed conception of security suggests new opportunities to include
questions of distributive ethics into the North-South relationship.  As global security takes on an
expanded set of meanings, to include economic, environmental and cultural security, so the context is
expanded beyond the narrow concerns with military security and defence of the state.  Similarly, a
move away from a state-based conception of security points to other aspects and values of social life,
including human needs for adequate food, shelter and a healthy environment.  This suggests that
development issues have the potential to take on new significance as these become issues of global
security, and thus a concern for the international community, rather than simply domestic concerns.
On the other hand, a changing international context also suggests new ethical dilemmas and
challenges.  In 1988, Beitz posed the questions this way: to what extent do the demands of
international justice place obligations on the rich countries to the poor countries?  The question today
may be posed slightly differently, since the changing environment suggests that the question of
distributive rights and obligations will be less an issue for governments and the simple transfer of
resources from state to state, and more a question of  management.  In Canada, the impetus for a
managerial approach to foreign policy is complex.  Heather Smith points to two dimensions of this
emphasis in her analysis of the 1994 foreign policy review: the first is the impact of fiscal restraints
and a resulting economist world view, and the second is the desire for certainty and regularity, and
therefore, a more controlled and focussed foreign policy in a world of flux.44  A move away from state-
based transfers of resources toward private investment, trade and less regulated financial transfers is
one policy result of an economistic or managerial approach.  Global distributive rights become less an
issue of public policy, and more of an issue of private management, passed on to the multinationals,
multilateral organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and investors, rather than
confronted as public international responsibilities.
However, in the case of global poverty, a move to deal with this as an issue of economic and
security management also contains ethical dilemmas.  Despite the theme of control and regularity, the
‘management’ of troubling ethical questions of global distribution may well undermine transparency in
foreign policy, making the goal of more rule-based internationalism even more elusive.  This is
because debates are transferred from high-profile, visible and publicly accountable institutions to
private institutions.  Although, for example, governments still provide ‘the regulatory framework
within which corporations act,’ they are experiencing a diminishment of their ‘power to compel’
corporations to act ethically.45  Although NGOs and multilateral development organizations are being
given a more prominent role in distributive obligations, their powers to advocate distributive ethics are
limited by their dependence on voluntary contributions.  A managerial approach thus also
compromises democratic accountability for international resource transfer policy, an important value
for Canadians.
As well, a focus on economic security has led to a renewed focus on Northern security in the
face of ‘threats’ of economic competition from the South.  This suggests a renewal of a concern with
national security and national economic interest.  Thus, we see that foreign aid, for example, is
increasingly cast as a vehicle for the promotion of trade and investment at home or as a means of
alleviating crises of mass human migration or natural disasters on a situational basis.  This is in sharp
contrast to a commitment to a new distributive ethic, since aid is once again viewed in instrumental or
ad-hoc terms, rather than being part of the structure of North-South relations.
This route to security also contains ethical dilemmas, since efforts to privatize North-South
relations in the context of Northern security and interests will contribute further to the growth of ties
between societies, and thus the level of interdependence between North and South.  It is this
interdependence which provided the original impetus for the NIEO.  The globalization of economic
relations makes the contrast and contradiction between conditions of life in North and South more
acute.  An intertwining of destinies between North and South may yet contribute to the conditions
which make a call for attention to distributive obligations more powerful.  However, it is not clear
whether these issues will be successfully addressed in public or multilateral forums, since the changing
roles and responsibilities of states in regard to these issues are less and less explicit.
In summary, then, while a changing international security context may provide opportunities to
integrate questions of distributive ethics into the international rather than the purely domestic realm, it
also contains new ethical dilemmas and questions prompted by growing interdependence between
North and South.  A managerial and instrumental approach to these questions, which tends to de-
politicize the issues, nevertheless prompts new ethical dilemmas of accountability, regulatory
responsibility and interdependence.
Conclusion
This paper has explored changes in ethical dilemmas and questions as we move from the Cold War
complex of normative practices and principles to a new, more complex and challenging set of security 
practices and principles.  As the conceptualization of security becomes broader, an emerging complex
of ethical and human rights dilemmas arises to confront Canadian foreign policy.  Given these
changes, what are some of the issues or problems emerging?  Some of the new or renewed issues or
questions are: Can a renewed commitment to collective security and multilateral security arrangements
overcome the tension between state and society interests?  Can collective security and other
multilateral enforcement mechanisms overcome the problem of double standards in application?  How
can peacekeeping be morally distinguished from other, more reprehensible forms of interventionism? 
What is the nature of the connection between security (however broadly construed) and ethical
humanitarian intervention, if any?  Is it appropriate or possible for Canada to distinguish itself as a
leader in legitimizing a new international principle of humanitarian intervention?  What is the ethical
link between human rights provision in LDCs and the resource obligations of the developed countries? 
How can one reconcile the tensions between a new interventionist global security order and domestic
democratization and development?  How can the tension between ‘action-oriented’ and ‘engagement-
oriented’ human rights strategies be resolved?  How can the tension between Northern economic
security, and a managerial approach to resource transfer, be reconciled with the question of global
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ethical obligations of the rich to the poor?
It is clear that the changing international security context presents both challenges and
opportunities.  Any new initiatives in policy cannot hope to address all of the ethical and normative
concerns which arise, however, and this list of new questions is not meant to be exhaustive or
exclusive of other emerging or important ethical issues.46  Nevertheless, it helps to examine the
changing conditions of history which influence ethical dilemmas and structure the choices and
possibilities available.
Ethical and human rights concerns are increasingly engaging the interest of both International
Relations theorists, foreign policy decision makers, and the Canadian public.  However, perhaps the
most important new developments which have energized interest in these issues is a move toward the
conceptual and practical integration of different, previously distinct, dimensions of social and political
life.  The blurring line between international and domestic politics suggests a new role for ethical
considerations.  The widening conception of security suggests new rights and responsibilities.  The
connections between different ‘policy areas’ — economics, security, democratization, development,
environment and human rights — make tensions and conflicts between different government
departments more acute.  More than ever, consistency between ethics and security policy will be
difficult to achieve.  The moral questions here are not whether we need to choose between necessity
and virtue, but rather what kind of security do we value, and whose?
The search for a new conception of security which can integrate these diverse concerns
continues, with various models, including common security, cooperative security, and human security,
seeking to form an overarching and internally consistent ethical guide for Canadian international
security policy.  This search is informed by two thrusts in the literature: on the one hand, a positive
push for a ‘new internationalism’ based on a renewed support for multilateral intervention in support
of conflict resolution, human values, democracy and market-based economies; on the other hand, a
darker view points to the many new threats and challenges facing global order, including nuclear and
conventional weapons proliferation, the rise of nationalism in the former Soviet republics, and
increasing civil strife in countries freed from the constraints of Cold War strategic policies.  This latter
view argues that Canadian influence and ability to “use our moral force for humanitarian purposes”47
may therefore be compromised and limited by a world of widening threats and challenges.  Whether
positive or negative, this ongoing theoretical reformulation of security suggests important new links
between security and ethics.  If Canadians continue to support a globalist approach, as the Report of
the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy of 1994 suggests, then that ‘moral
force’ relies on demonstrated consistency between domestic and foreign policy.  This ethical blending
of domestic and foreign policy suggests that standards espoused for others are increasingly applied at
home as well.  This is, in fact, perhaps the unexpected ‘flip side’ of  projecting Canadian values
abroad.
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